I am an economist on a 5-year research fellowship at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. I work on topics across public and labor economics, often partnering with government agencies to improve public services and gain insight into social behavior.
I received a PhD in Economics from Harvard University and a BA in Economics and International Relations from Stanford University.
Office: Herbert Hoover Memorial Building (HHMB) 107
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305
We study the mental health of graduate students at economics PhD programs in the US. Using clinically validated surveys, we find that 18% of graduate students experience moderate or severe symptoms of depression and anxiety - more than three times the population average - and 11% report suicidal ideation in a two-week period. The average PhD student reports greater feelings of loneliness than does the average retired American. Only 26% of economics students report feeling that their work is useful always or most of the time, compared with 70% of economics faculty and 63% of the working age population. Depression and symptoms of anxiety increase with time in the program: 25% of students in years 5+ of their programs experience moderate or severe symptoms of depression or anxiety compared with 12-14.5% of first-year students. Many students with significant symptoms of mental distress are not in treatment. We provide recommendations for students, faculty, and administrators on ways to improve graduate student mental health.
Using a network approach, we show how the federal funds market was transformed during the financial crisis through the collapse of the ABCP market in 2007, changes in monetary policy implementation, and an increase in counterparty credit risk. For both aggregate and bank-level network metrics, we find that increases in counterparty and liquidity risk are associated with reduced lending activity within the network. We also provide evidence that network peer effects are strong and influence banks’ holdings of reserve balances and rates paid in the federal funds market. Finally, we document how these changes to the network structure dampened the transmission of monetary policy.
Most U.S. government spending on highways and bridges is done through “scaling” procurement auctions, in which private construction firms submit unit price bids for each piece of material required to complete a project. Using data on bridge maintenance projects undertaken by the Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), we present evidence that firm bidding behavior in this context is consistent with optimal skewing under risk aversion: firms limit their risk exposure by placing lower unit bids on items with greater uncertainty. We estimate bidders’ risk aversion, the risk in each auction, and the distribution of bidders’ private costs. Simulating equilibrium item-level bids under counterfactual settings, we estimate the fraction of project spending that is due to risk and evaluate auction mechanisms under consideration by policymakers. We find that scaling auctions provide substantial savings relative to lump sum auctions and show how our framework can be used to evaluate alternative auction designs.
Female workers earn $0.89 for each male-worker dollar even in a unionized workplace where tasks, wages, and promotion schedules are identical for men and women by design. We use administrative time card data on bus and train operators to show that the earnings gap can be explained by female operators taking, on average, 1.5 fewer hours of overtime and 1.3 more hours of unpaid time-off per week than male operators. Female operators, especially those who have dependents, pursue schedule conventionality, predictability, and controllability more than male operators. Analyzing two policy changes, we demonstrate that while reducing schedule controllability can reduce the earnings gap, it can also make workers—particularly female workers—worse off.
I use regression discontinuity analysis to measure the effect of one of the Affordable Housing Goals, the Underserved Areas Goal (UAG), on the number of whole single‐family mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (GSEs) in undeserved census tracts for 1996–2002. Focusing additionally on tracts that became UAG‐eligible in 2005–2006, I measure the effect of the UAG during peak years for the subprime market. The results suggest a small UAG effect and challenge the view that the goals caused the GSEs to supply substantially more credit to high‐risk borrowers than they otherwise would have supplied during the subprime boom.